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Abstract:
Heterogeneity in intrinsic motivation affects the optimal contract offered to employees in teams. Under indi-
vidual incentives, the effort exerted by both motivated and selfish employees is distorted. This distortion is
mitigated if employees receive a wage based on team performance. As a result, the principal prefers to use
team incentives, while motivated employees are better off with individual incentives.
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1 Introduction
To screen and motivate employees working in teams, firms make use of compensation schemes linked to indi-
vidual and/or team performance (see Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan 2003; Bryson et al. 2012). Which is the
optimal compensation scheme in sectors where employees work in teams and tend to be intrinsically motivated
toward the projects they undertake? This is a relevant question, as it is well known that, especially in the public
service sector, individuals are heterogeneous in their intrinsic motivation, i.e. they are interested not only in
their monetary compensation but also in the project’s outcome (see Shields and Ward 2001; Antonazzo et al.
2003; Ikenwilo and Scott 2007; Leonard and Masatu 2010).
This article studies the optimal employment contract offered to intrinsically motivated employees when
their motivation is their private information and they work in teams. In particular, we explore whether the em-
ployer will prefer to pay her employees based on their individual or team performance. We find that when the
employer offers her employees individual incentives, the effort levels of both motivated and selfish employees
are distorted downwards. However, this distortion is mitigated under team incentives, as the employer adopts
a more complete contract that depends on both employees’ effort levels. Team incentives allow the employer to
pay a lower information rent to motivated employees and, as a result, to obtain a higher profit.
We contribute to the literature on intrinsically motivated employees and adverse selection (see, among oth-
ers, Delfgaauw and Dur 2007; 2008; Barigozzi and Burani 2016). The present article departs from the previous
literature by considering teamwork and consequently the possibility that the employer offers team incentives.
In this vein, our paper is closely related to Kosfeld and von Siemens (2009, 2011, 2014). They also consider team
production and adverse selection, but they focus on the externalities generated by conditionally cooperative
employees. By focusing on an adverse-selection problem, our paper complements the literature that studies
optimal incentive contracts offered to intrinsically-motivated employees in a moral-hazard setting (see among
others Itoh 2004; Friebel and Schnedler 2011).
2 Model
We develop a model where a principal hires two employees to work on a joint project. The principal offers her
employees a contract that consists of a wage, 𝜔, and effort, 𝑒. The effort of each employee is observable and
contractible. The principal has the following profit function:
Π = 𝑓 (𝑒𝐴, 𝑒𝐵) − 𝜔𝐴 −𝜔𝐵, (1)
where 𝑓 (𝑒𝐴, 𝑒𝐵) represents the principal’s gross profits from the project. The function is symmetric, strictly
increasing in the effort of both employees, concave and twice continuously differentiable with 𝑓 (0, 0) = 0, 𝑓𝑒𝑖 >
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0, 𝑓𝑒𝑖𝑒𝑗 ≥ 0, and 𝑓𝑒𝑖𝑒𝑖 ≤ 0with 𝑖, 𝑗 = 𝐴, 𝐵 and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. The results of the paper will hold for any concave function that
is monotonically increasing in the effort levels and assigns equal weight to them. However, for illustrative pur-
poses and to ensure that our results do not depend on the complementarity/substitutability of the production
function, we focus our analysis on the following two main specifications:
1. A Cobb-Douglas function: 𝑓 (𝑒𝐴, 𝑒𝐵) = √𝑒𝐴𝑒𝐵.
2. A linear function: 𝑓 (𝑒𝐴, 𝑒𝐵) = 𝑒𝐴 + 𝑒𝐵.
The key assumption of this model is that the employees can be intrinsically motivated. This means that they
may care not only about their wage but also about the outcome of the project they undertake. As the outcome
depends on the effort provided by both employees, the utility of a motivated employee depends also on his
teammate’s effort. Employee 𝑖’s utility is:
𝑉𝑖(𝜔𝑖, 𝑒𝑖; 𝜃𝑖) = 𝜔𝑖 −
1
2
𝑒2𝑖 + 𝜃𝑖𝑓 (𝑒𝑖, 𝑒𝑗) (2)
The cost of exerting effort is given by a quadratic cost function 𝐶(𝑒𝑖) =
1
2
𝑒2𝑖 . The exogenous parameter 𝜃𝑖 ≥ 0
represents employee 𝑖’s intrinsic motivation with respect to the project and it is their private information.1
There are two types of employees: self-interested with 𝜃𝑖 = 𝜃 = 0 and motivated with 𝜃𝑖 = 𝜃 > 0.
2 The
unconditional probability that the employee is either type is 1/2; the probability that the employee is a high
(low) type conditional on his teammate being a high (low) type is denoted by 𝜇. Employees are risk neutral,
wealth constrained and have a reservation wage of zero.
The timing of the game is as follows. In stage 0, each employee is informed about hismotivation towards the
project; in stage 1, the principal offers amenu of contracts consisting of levels of effort andwages; in stage 2, em-
ployees independently decide whether or not to accept the contract. In stage 3, the effort is exerted, production
is undertaken, wages are paid, and profits are realized.
The model is solved under the assumption that the type of contract chosen by each agent becomes known
before production starts (between stages 2 and 3). This assumption allows the principal to potentially condition
each agent’s wage and level of performance on those chosen by his teammate.3 Parties are unable to renegotiate
the contract.
3 Benchmark
If the employees’ motivation is observable, the principal can exactly compensate each employee for their pro-
duction cost. The wages cover the cost of effort net of the intrinsic benefit derived from the project, making each
employee indifferent between accepting and rejecting the contract, given the required level of effort:
𝜔𝑖 =
1
2
𝑒2𝑖 − 𝜃𝑖𝑓 (𝑒𝑖, 𝑒𝑗). (3)
Proposition 1
Under perfect information on motivation, the principal requires the same level of effort from both employees, for any
team composition.
Independently of the production function considered, the principal asks the employees to exert the same
level of effort, even if the team is heterogeneous, i.e. 𝜃𝐴 ≠ 𝜃𝐵. This would not happen in an adverse selection
model with heterogeneity in productivity. The intuition is the following. While in the standard model the prin-
cipal would obtain a highermarginal revenue from the high type and thus would require a higher level of effort
from him, in our model the principal obtains the same marginal revenue from both types. This is due to the
fact that in our model the principal can extract motivated employees’ intrinsic utility, which is generated by the
effort levels of both motivated and selfish employees. For the same effort, motivated employees receive a lower
wage than selfish employees.
4 ScreeningProblem
When the employees’ motivation is their private information, the principal maximizes her profits subject to
participation and incentive constraints. We consider incentives based on individual performance, i.e. 𝜔𝑖(𝑒𝑖),
and team performance, i.e. 𝜔𝑖(𝑒𝑖, 𝑒𝑗).
4
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Proposition 2
Under individual incentives,
i. the principal requires higher effort from the motivated employee;
ii. there is a distortion at the top and at the bottom.
The principal pays an information rent to the motivated employee to induce him not to mimic the self-
ish employee, and – if he has a motivated colleague – to compensate him for having a colleague who might
mimic a selfish type. Since the information rent depends on the outcome of the project, and so on the effort of
both the motivated and the selfish employees, both types of employees exert less effort than in the first best,
for either production function. In particular, under the linear production function, the effort of the motivated
employee is lower than the first-best effort of a motivated employee with a motivated teammate; under the
Cobb-Douglas production function, the effort of the motivated employee is lower than the first-best effort of a
motivated employee, regardless of his teammate’s type. It follows that under individual incentives there is a
double distortion. The distortion at the top is more severe under the Cobb-Douglas production function.
As the probability that an employee is motivated conditional on his teammate beingmotivated, 𝜇, increases,
the distortion at the top is exacerbated. The intuition is the following. As a motivated employee becomes more
likely to have amotivated teammate, the gain from pretending to be selfish becomes greater. To induce informa-
tion revelation, the principal must pay the motivated employees a higher information rent. Since this is costly,
the principal optimally reduces the effort required from motivated employees.
Proposition 3
Under team incentives,
i. the principal requires the same level of effort from both employees in the team;
ii. the distortion at the top is mitigated.
Under team incentives, as in the first best, the principal requires the same effort from both employees, in-
dependently of the team composition. The distortion at the top that is obtained under individual incentives
is reduced under team incentives, because the principal can offer a more complete contract that depends on
both employees’ effort levels. In particular, for either production function, the distortion at the top when both
employees in the team are motivated disappears under team incentives. There is still a distortion in the effort of
a motivated employee with a selfish teammate, but overall the distortion at the top is mitigated under team in-
centives. The selfish employee who works with a motivated employee exerts more effort under team incentives
than under individual incentives.
As under individual incentives, a motivated employee receives an information rent not to mimic a selfish
employee. This rent crucially depends on 𝜃 and the effort a motivated employee would expect to exert if he
pretended to be selfish. In particular, the information rent is: 𝜃[𝜇𝑓 (𝑒𝐻𝑖𝐿, 𝑒
𝐿
𝑗𝐻) + (1 − 𝜇)𝑓 (𝑒
𝐿
𝑖𝐿, 𝑒
𝐿
𝑗𝐿)].
5 To reduce the
information rent given to motivated employees, the principal distorts downward the effort requested in teams
where there is at least one selfish employee. Note also that an increase in 𝜇 negatively affects the effort exerted
by employees in heterogeneous teams, while it positively affects the effort exerted by selfish employees working
together.
Corollary 1
Under team incentives the principal pays a lower information rent to motivated employees than under individual
incentives, thus obtaining higher profits.
By offering a contract that depends on the effort of both employees, the principal can pay a lower information
rent to motivated employees under team incentives than under individual incentives, and thus obtains a higher
profit. It follows that the principal prefers to use team incentives, while the motivated employees are better off
with individual incentives.
Our results are obtained under the assumption that employees are risk neutral. If the employees are risk-
averse towards income shocks, they will be even less willing to receive a payment based on team performance.
Since each employee bears a higher risk for having the contract tied to the type of his colleague, about which
he is uncertain, he has to be compensated with a higher wage. As a result, profits are reduced and the principal
might also be better off by using individual incentives.
3
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5 Conclusion
This article shows that, when an employer cannot observe her employees’motivation toward the project and the
employees work in teams, shewill prefer to pay them on the base of their team performance rather than on their
individual performance. This finding complements previous findings in favor of the use of team incentives in
organizations (among others, Che and Yoo 2001; Auriol, Friebel, and Pechlivanos 2002; Corts 2007).
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Appendix
Benchmark
Proof of Proposition 1. The principal maximizes her profits subject to eq. (3). Profits can be rewritten as:
Π = 𝑓 (𝑒𝐴, 𝑒𝐵) − (
1
2
𝑒2𝐴 − 𝜃𝐴𝑓 (𝑒𝐴, 𝑒𝐵)) − (
1
2
𝑒2𝐵 − 𝜃𝐵𝑓 (𝑒𝐴, 𝑒𝐵)) .
Taking the first-order condition with respect to 𝑒𝐴 and 𝑒𝐵 yields the following:
𝜕𝑓 (𝑒𝐴, 𝑒𝐵)
𝜕𝑒𝐴
(1+ 𝜃𝐴 + 𝜃𝐵) = 𝑒𝐴;
𝜕𝑓 (𝑒𝐴, 𝑒𝐵)
𝜕𝑒𝐵
(1+ 𝜃𝐴 + 𝜃𝐵) = 𝑒𝐵.
Under complete information, the first-best effort levels satisfy the following conditions.
i. If both employees are motivated, i.e. 𝜃𝐴 = 𝜃𝐵 = 𝜃, 𝑒𝐻 =
𝜕𝑓 (𝑒𝐻,𝑒𝐻)
𝜕𝑒𝐻
(1+ 2𝜃);
ii. If both employees are selfish, i.e. 𝜃𝐴 = 𝜃𝐵 = 𝜃, 𝑒𝐿 =
𝜕𝑓 (𝑒𝐿,𝑒𝐿)
𝜕𝑒𝐿
;
iii. If only one employee is motivated, i.e. 𝜃𝑖 = 𝜃 and 𝜃𝑗 = 𝜃, 𝑒𝐻 =
𝜕𝑓 (𝑒𝐻,𝑒𝐿)
𝜕𝑒𝐻
(1+ 𝜃) and 𝑒𝐿 =
𝜕𝑓 (𝑒𝐿,𝑒𝐻)
𝜕𝑒𝐿
(1+ 𝜃).
Irrespective of the function we consider, the principal requires the same level of effort from both agents, even
when the team is heterogeneous.
i. If both employees are motivated,
𝑒𝐻 =
⎧{
⎨{⎩
1+2𝜃
2
if 𝑓 (𝑒𝐴, 𝑒𝐵) = √𝑒𝐴𝑒𝐵;
1+ 2𝜃 if 𝑓 (𝑒𝐴, 𝑒𝐵) = 𝑒𝐴 + 𝑒𝐵
ii. If both employees are selfish,
𝑒𝐿 =
⎧{
⎨{⎩
1
2
if 𝑓 (𝑒𝐴, 𝑒𝐵) = √𝑒𝐴𝑒𝐵;
1 if 𝑓 (𝑒𝐴, 𝑒𝐵) = 𝑒𝐴 + 𝑒𝐵
iii. If only one employee is motivated,
𝑒𝐻 = 𝑒𝐿 =
⎧{
⎨{⎩
1+𝜃
2
if 𝑓 (𝑒𝐴, 𝑒𝐵) = √𝑒𝐴𝑒𝐵;
1+ 𝜃 if 𝑓 (𝑒𝐴, 𝑒𝐵) = 𝑒𝐴 + 𝑒𝐵
4
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ScreeningProblem
The participation and incentive constraints are:
𝜔𝑖𝐿 −
1
2
𝑒2𝑖𝐿 ⩾ 0 (𝑃𝐶𝑖𝐿)
𝜔𝑖𝐻 −
1
2
𝑒2𝑖𝐻 + 𝜃[𝜇𝑓 (𝑒𝑖𝐻, 𝑒𝑗𝐻) + (1− 𝜇)𝑓 (𝑒𝑖𝐻, 𝑒𝑗𝐿)] ≥ 0 (𝑃𝐶𝑖𝐻)
𝜔𝑖𝐿 −
1
2
𝑒2𝑖𝐿 ≥ 𝜔𝑖𝐻 −
1
2
𝑒2𝑖𝐻 (𝐼𝐶𝑖𝐿)
𝜔𝑖𝐻 −
1
2
𝑒2𝑖𝐻 + ̄𝜃[𝜇𝑓 (𝑒𝑖𝐻, 𝑒𝑗𝐻) + (1− 𝜇)𝑓 (𝑒𝑖𝐻, 𝑒𝑗𝐿)] ⩾
𝜔𝑖𝐿 −
1
2
𝑒2𝑖𝐿 + ̄𝜃[𝜇𝑓 (𝑒𝑖𝐿, 𝑒𝑗𝐻) + (1− 𝜇)𝑓 (𝑒𝑖𝐿, 𝑒𝑗𝐿)] (𝐼𝐶𝑖𝐻)
with 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵} and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗.
First, if equations (𝐼𝐶𝐻) and (𝑃𝐶𝐿) are satisfied, then
𝜔𝑖𝐻 −
1
2
𝑒2𝑖𝐻 + 𝜃[𝜇𝑓 (𝑒𝑖𝐻, 𝑒𝑗𝐻) + (1− 𝜇)𝑓 (𝑒𝑖𝐻, 𝑒𝑗𝐿)] ≥
𝜃[𝜇𝑓 (𝑒𝑖𝐿, 𝑒𝑗𝐻) + (1− 𝜇)𝑓 (𝑒𝑖𝐿, 𝑒𝑗𝐿)] ≥ 0.
(4)
Equation (4) reflects the fact that a motivated employee receives a higher surplus from the project than a
selfish one. (𝑃𝐶𝑖𝐻) is satisfied and cannot be binding because
𝜃[𝜇𝑓 (𝑒𝑖𝐿, 𝑒𝑗𝐻) + (1− 𝜇)𝑓 (𝑒𝑖𝐿, 𝑒𝑗𝐿)] ≥ 0
must be satisfied as well. In contrast, (𝑃𝐶𝑖𝐿) must be binding. Next, (𝐼𝐶𝑖𝐻) must be binding, otherwise the
principal could increase 𝜔𝑖𝐻 slightly and keep all the constraints satisfied. Finally, the incentive constraint for
the selfish type cannot be binding given that
𝜃[𝜇𝑓 (𝑒𝑖𝐻, 𝑒𝑗𝐻) + (1− 𝜇)𝑓 (𝑒𝑖𝐻, 𝑒𝑗𝐿)] ≥ 0
must be satisfied.
Proof of Proposition 2. The participation constraint for the self-interested employees (𝑃𝐶𝐿) and the incen-
tive constraint for themotivated employees (𝐼𝐶𝐻) are binding.Using (𝑃𝐶𝐿) and (𝐼𝐶𝐻), the optimalwages satisfy
the following equation:
𝜔𝑖𝐿 =
1
2
𝑒2𝑖𝐿;
𝜔𝑖𝐻 =
1
2
𝑒2𝑖𝐻 − 𝜃[𝜇𝑓 (𝑒𝑖𝐻, 𝑒𝑗𝐻) + (1− 𝜇)𝑓 (𝑒𝑖𝐻, 𝑒𝑗𝐿)] + 𝜃[𝜇𝑓 (𝑒𝑖𝐿, 𝑒𝑗𝐻) + (1− 𝜇)𝑓 (𝑒𝑖𝐿, 𝑒𝑗𝐿)],
(5)
where 𝜃[𝜇𝑓 (𝑒𝑖𝐿, 𝑒𝑗𝐻) + (1− 𝜇)𝑓 (𝑒𝑖𝐿, 𝑒𝑗𝐿)] is the information rent paid to motivated employees.
The principal maximizes profits subject to eq. (5). Profits can be rewritten as follows:
Π =
𝜇
2
[𝑓 (𝑒𝑖𝐻, 𝑒𝑗𝐻) + 𝑓 (𝑒𝑖𝐿, 𝑒𝑗𝐿)] +
1− 𝜇
2
[𝑓 (𝑒𝑖𝐻, 𝑒𝑗𝐿) + 𝑓 (𝑒𝑖𝐿, 𝑒𝑗𝐻)] −
1
2
[1
2
𝑒2𝑖𝐻 +
1
2
𝑒2𝑗𝐻 +
1
2
𝑒2𝑖𝐿 +
1
2
𝑒2𝑗𝐿]+
+ 𝜃
2
[2𝜇𝑓 (𝑒𝑖𝐻, 𝑒𝑗𝐻) + (1− 2𝜇)[𝑓 (𝑒𝑖𝐻, 𝑒𝑗𝐿) + 𝑓 (𝑒𝑖𝐿, 𝑒𝑗𝐻)] − 2(1− 𝜇)𝑓 (𝑒𝑖𝐿, 𝑒𝑗𝐿)].
(6)
Taking the first-order conditions with respect to 𝑒𝑖𝐿 and 𝑒𝑖𝐻 yields the following:
𝑒𝑖𝐿 =𝜇⎛⎜
⎝
𝜕𝑓 (𝑒𝑖𝐿, 𝑒𝑗𝐿)
𝜕𝑒𝑖𝐿
⎞⎟
⎠
+ (1− 𝜇)⎛⎜
⎝
𝜕𝑓 (𝑒𝑖𝐿, 𝑒𝑗𝐻)
𝜕𝑒𝑖𝐿
⎞⎟
⎠
(1+ 𝜃) − 𝜇𝜃⎛⎜
⎝
𝜕𝑓 (𝑒𝑖𝐿, 𝑒𝑗𝐻)
𝜕𝑒𝑖𝐿
⎞⎟
⎠
− 2(1− 𝜇)𝜃⎛⎜
⎝
𝜕𝑓 (𝑒𝑖𝐿, 𝑒𝑗𝐿)
𝜕𝑒𝑖𝐿
⎞⎟
⎠
;
𝑒𝑖𝐻 =𝜇⎛⎜
⎝
𝜕𝑓 (𝑒𝑖𝐻, 𝑒𝑗𝐻)
𝜕𝑒𝑖𝐻
⎞⎟
⎠
(1+ 2𝜃) + (1− 𝜇)⎛⎜
⎝
𝜕𝑓 (𝑒𝑖𝐻, 𝑒𝑗𝐿)
𝜕𝑒𝑖𝐻
⎞⎟
⎠
(1+ 𝜃) − 𝜃𝜇⎛⎜
⎝
𝜕𝑓 (𝑒𝑖𝐻, 𝑒𝑗𝐿)
𝜕𝑒𝑖𝐻
⎞⎟
⎠
.
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Analogous expressions could be derived for agent 𝑗. By comparing the first-order conditions with those
obtained under the first best, it can be noted that if teams consist of homogeneous agents with certainty, i.e.
𝜇 = 1, both motivated and selfish employees exert a lower effort than in the first best. In contrast, if teams
consist of heterogeneous agents with certainty, i.e. 𝜇 = 0, the effort is distorted only at the bottom, as in the
standard adverse selection model. Therefore, an increase in 𝜇 has a negative impact on the effort of motivated
employees under individual incentives: it magnifies the distortion at the top.
For the Cobb–Douglas and linear production functions:
i. If the employee is selfish,
𝑒𝐿
⎧{
⎨{⎩
∈ ( 1
2
(1− 𝜃), 1
2
) if 𝑓 (𝑒𝐴, 𝑒𝐵) = √𝑒𝐴𝑒𝐵;
= 1− 𝜃 if 𝑓 (𝑒𝐴, 𝑒𝐵) = 𝑒𝐴 + 𝑒𝐵.
ii. If the employee is motivated,
𝑒𝐻
⎧{
⎨{⎩
∈ ( 1
2
, 1
2
(1+ 𝜃)) if 𝑓 (𝑒𝐴, 𝑒𝐵) = √𝑒𝐴𝑒𝐵;
= 1+ 𝜃 if 𝑓 (𝑒𝐴, 𝑒𝐵) = 𝑒𝐴 + 𝑒𝐵.
When 𝑓 (𝑒𝐴, 𝑒𝐵) = 𝑒𝐴+𝑒𝐵, the effort of the selfish employee is lower than the first-best effort level of a selfish
employee, whether his teammate is selfish ormotivated. In contrast, the effort of themotivated employee equals
the first-best effort of a motivated employee with a selfish teammate, but is lower than the first-best effort of a
motivated employee with a motivated teammate. The latter implies that, besides the distortion at the bottom,
there is also a distortion at the top.
When 𝑓 (𝑒𝐴, 𝑒𝐵) = √𝑒𝐴𝑒𝐵, the effort of the selfish (motivated) employee is lower than the first-best effort level
of a selfish (motivated) employee, irrespective of his teammate’s type. Thus, there is a distortion at the bottom
and at the top.
Proof of Proposition 3. Also under team incentives (𝑃𝐶𝐿) and (𝐼𝐶𝐻)must be binding.
6 The incentive con-
straint for a motivated employee requires that the expected utility that he receives is higher than the expected
utility that he obtains by pretending to be selfish. In expectation, a motivated employee knows that with prob-
ability 𝜇 he will be in a team with another motivated teammate and with probability (1 − 𝜇) in a team with a
selfish one. Participation constraints guarantee that in expectation both types accept the contract.
From (𝑃𝐶𝐿) the optimal wage for selfish employees satisfies the following equation:
𝜇[𝜔𝑖𝐿(𝑒
𝐿
𝑖𝐿, 𝑒
𝐿
𝑗𝐿)] + (1− 𝜇)[𝜔𝑖𝐿(𝑒
𝐻
𝑖𝐿, 𝑒
𝐿
𝑗𝐻)] = 𝜇 [
1
2
(𝑒𝐿𝑖𝐿)
2
] + (1− 𝜇) [1
2
(𝑒𝐻𝑖𝐿)
2
] ; (7)
and from (𝐼𝐶𝐻) the optimal wage for motivated employees satisfies the following equation:
𝜇[𝜔𝑖𝐻(𝑒
𝐻
𝑖𝐻, 𝑒
𝐻
𝑗𝐻)] + (1− 𝜇)[𝜔𝑖𝐻(𝑒
𝐿
𝑖𝐻, 𝑒
𝐻
𝑗𝐿)] = 𝜇 [
1
2
(𝑒𝐻𝑖𝐻)
2
− 𝜃𝑓(𝑒𝐻𝑖𝐻, 𝑒
𝐻
𝑗𝐻)]+
+ (1− 𝜇) [1
2
(𝑒𝐿𝑖𝐻)
2
− 𝜃𝑓(𝑒𝐿𝑖𝐻, 𝑒
𝐻
𝑗𝐿)] + 𝜃[𝜇𝑓(𝑒
𝐻
𝑖𝐿, 𝑒
𝐿
𝑗𝐻) + (1− 𝜇)𝑓(𝑒
𝐿
𝑖𝐿, 𝑒
𝐿
𝑗𝐿)],
(8)
where 𝜃[𝜇𝑓(𝑒𝐻𝑖𝐿, 𝑒
𝐿
𝑗𝐻)+ (1−𝜇)𝑓(𝑒
𝐿
𝑖𝐿, 𝑒
𝐿
𝑗𝐿)] is the information rent paid to motivated employees. The principal
chooses effort levels to maximize her profit function subject to eqs (7) and (8). After some simple computations,
profits can be rewritten as follows:
Π =
𝜇
2
[𝑓(𝑒𝐻𝑖𝐻, 𝑒
𝐻
𝑗𝐻) −
1
2
(𝑒𝐻𝑖𝐻)
2
+ 𝜃𝑓(𝑒𝐻𝑖𝐻, 𝑒
𝐻
𝑗𝐻) −
1
2
(𝑒𝐻𝑗𝐻)
2
+ 𝜃𝑓(𝑒𝐻𝑖𝐻, 𝑒
𝐻
𝑗𝐻)]+
+
𝜇
2
[𝑓(𝑒𝐿𝑖𝐿, 𝑒
𝐿
𝑗𝐿) −
1
2
(𝑒𝐿𝑖𝐿)
2
− 1
2
(𝑒𝐿𝑗𝐿)
2
]+
+
1− 𝜇
2
[𝑓(𝑒𝐿𝑖𝐻, 𝑒
𝐻
𝑗𝐿) −
1
2
(𝑒𝐿𝑖𝐻)
2
+ 𝜃𝑓(𝑒𝐿𝑖𝐻, 𝑒
𝐻
𝑗𝐿) −
1
2
(𝑒𝐻𝑗𝐿)
2
]+
+
1− 𝜇
2
[𝑓(𝑒𝐻𝑖𝐿, 𝑒
𝐿
𝑗𝐻) −
1
2
(𝑒𝐻𝑖𝐿)
2
− 1
2
(𝑒𝐿𝑗𝐻)
2
+ 𝜃𝑓(𝑒𝐻𝑖𝐿, 𝑒
𝐿
𝑗𝐻)]+
−𝜃
2
[𝜇[𝑓(𝑒𝐻𝑖𝐿, 𝑒
𝐿
𝑗𝐻) + 𝑓(𝑒
𝐿
𝑖𝐻, 𝑒
𝐻
𝑗𝐿)] + 2(1− 𝜇)𝑓(𝑒
𝐿
𝑖𝐿, 𝑒
𝐿
𝑗𝐿)]
(9)
Taking the first-order conditions, the effort level must satisfy the following:
i. If both employees are motivated, 𝑒𝐻𝑖𝐻 =
𝜕𝑓 (𝑒𝐻𝑖𝐻,𝑒
𝐻
𝑗𝐻)
𝜕𝑒𝐻𝑖𝐻
(1+ 2𝜃);
6
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ii. If both employees are selfish, 𝑒𝐿𝑖𝐿 =
𝜕𝑓 (𝑒𝐿𝑖𝐿,𝑒
𝐿
𝑗𝐿)
𝜕𝑒𝐿𝑖𝐿
[1− 2𝜃( 1−𝜇
𝜇
)];
iii. In heterogeneous teams, 𝑒𝐿𝑖𝐻 =
𝜕𝑓 (𝑒𝐿𝑖𝐻,𝑒
𝐻
𝑗𝐿)
𝜕𝑒𝐿𝑖𝐻
[1+ 𝜃( 1−2𝜇
1−𝜇
)] and 𝑒𝐻𝑖𝐿 =
𝜕𝑓 (𝑒𝐻𝑖𝐿,𝑒
𝐿
𝑗𝐻)
𝜕𝑒𝐻𝑖𝐿
[1+ 𝜃( 1−2𝜇
1−𝜇
)].
Analogous expressions could be derived for agent 𝑗. By symmetry, inwhat followswe can rewrite each effort
level as 𝑒𝐻𝑖𝐻 = 𝑒
𝐻
𝐻, 𝑒
𝐿
𝑖𝐿 = 𝑒
𝐿
𝐿, 𝑒
𝐻
𝑖𝐿 = 𝑒
𝐻
𝐿 and 𝑒
𝐿
𝑖𝐻 = 𝑒
𝐿
𝐻. For the Cobb–Douglas and linear production functions:
i. If both employees are motivated,
𝑒𝐿𝐻 =
⎧{
⎨{⎩
1+2𝜃
2
if 𝑓 (𝑒𝐴, 𝑒𝐵) = √𝑒𝐴𝑒𝐵;
1+ 2𝜃 if 𝑓 (𝑒𝐴, 𝑒𝐵) = 𝑒𝐴 + 𝑒𝐵.
ii. If both employees are selfish,
𝑒𝐿𝐿 =
⎧{
⎨{⎩
1
2
[1− 2𝜃 ( 1−𝜇
𝜇
)] if 𝑓 (𝑒𝐴, 𝑒𝐵) = √𝑒𝐴𝑒𝐵;
1− 2𝜃 ( 1−𝜇
𝜇
) if 𝑓 (𝑒𝐴, 𝑒𝐵) = 𝑒𝐴 + 𝑒𝐵.
iii. In heterogeneous teams,
𝑒𝐿𝐻 = 𝑒
𝐻
𝐿 =
⎧{
⎨{⎩
1
2
[1+ 𝜃( 1−2𝜇
1−𝜇
)] if 𝑓 (𝑒𝐴, 𝑒𝐵) = √𝑒𝐴𝑒𝐵;
1+ 𝜃( 1−2𝜇
1−𝜇
) if 𝑓 (𝑒𝐴, 𝑒𝐵) = 𝑒𝐴 + 𝑒𝐵.
Similarly to the first best, the principal requires the same level of effort from both agents, even when the
team is heterogeneous. For either production function, under team incentives the distortion at the top when
both employees are motivated disappears. However, there is a distortion for the motivated employee with a
selfish teammate. This distortion allows the principal to pay a lower information rent to motivated employees,
as stated by Corollary 1. Overall, the distortion at the top is mitigated under team incentives.
It is worth noting that an increase in 𝜇 has a negative impact on the effort exerted by employees in hetero-
geneous teams, but positively affects the effort exerted by selfish employees working together:
𝜕𝑒𝐿𝑖𝐻
𝜕𝜇
=
𝜕𝑒𝐻𝑖𝐿
𝜕𝜇
= − 𝜃
(1− 𝜇)2
≤ 0;
𝜕𝑒𝐿𝑖𝐿
𝜕𝜇
= 2𝜃
𝜇2
≥ 0.
To guarantee that effort levels are not negative, it is assumed that 𝜇 belongs to the following interval: 𝜇 ∈
[ 2𝜃
1+2𝜃
, 1+𝜃
1+2𝜃
].
Proof of Corollary 1. Suppose that 𝑓 (𝑒𝐴, 𝑒𝐵) = 𝑒𝐴+𝑒𝐵. The information rent paid to the motivated employee
under individual incentives is given by
𝐼𝑅𝐼𝐼 = 2𝜃[1− 𝜃(1− 𝜇)].
The information rent paid to the motivated employee under team incentives is given by
𝐼𝑅𝑇𝐼 = 2𝜃 ⎡⎢
⎣
1−
𝜃(2− 6𝜇 + 5𝜇2)
𝜇(1− 𝜇)
⎤
⎥
⎦
.
We find that the information rent paid to the motivated employee is always lower under team incentives than
under individual incentives for any 𝜃 and any 𝜇 ∈ (0, 1).
Substituting the respective effort levels into eqs (6) and (9), we obtain the principal’s profits under individual
and team incentives:
Π𝐼𝐼 = 1+ 𝜃
2
;
Π𝑇𝐼 = 1+ 𝜃
2
( 2
𝜇
+ 1
1− 𝜇
− 4) .
Comparing the profits, we find that Π𝑇𝐼 > Π𝐼𝐼 if 𝜃
2
[2−6𝜇+5𝜇2]
(1−𝜇)𝜇
> 0, that is always the case for any 𝜃 and any
𝜇 ∈ (0, 1).
This result holds also when 𝑓 (𝑒𝐴, 𝑒𝐵) = √𝑒𝐴𝑒𝐵. The proof is similar and available upon request.
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Notes
1 The information asymmetry is uni-dimensional. As observed for example by Cassar (2016), mechanism design problems where the in-
formation asymmetry is multi-dimensional are hardly tractable and highly dependent on parameters’ values and functions’ specifications.
2 We assume that the principal and the employees obtain the same benefits from the project, namely 𝑓 (𝑒𝑖, 𝑒𝑗). Therefore, an alternative
interpretation of 𝜃𝑖 is that employees may have altruistic preferences towards the principal, as they internalize the principal’s utility.
3 As each agent is initially unaware of the other agent’s type, they cannot collude in Stage 2.
4 While there are also other forms of compensation schemes, such as benefit-sharing and tournaments, individual incentives are very
common in organizations and team incentives have been increasingly used over the last decade (Bryson et al. 2012). In light of this, we
focus our analysis on these two forms of compensation schemes.
5 Under team incentives, the principal can condition the agent’s effort level on that of his colleague in the team. Therefore, 𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 is the effort
required by agent 𝑖when his type is 𝑟, while the type of his colleague is 𝑠, where 𝑟, 𝑠 = 𝐿,𝐻 and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗.
6 The proof is very similar to the one provided under individual incentives and available under request.
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